

DOI: 10.37930/2782-6465-2026-5-2-75-85

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A EURASIAN AXIS FOR A MULTILATERAL ORDER: TÜRKİYE-RUSSIA-CHINA COOPERATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL STABILITY

Abstract: A new international order is emerging. The central issue is no longer whether unipolarity is coming to an end. Rather, the key question is whether the new distribution of power will be organized through military blocs and economic coercion, or through multilateral cooperation among sovereign states. This article expands upon a proposal presented at the St. Petersburg Economic Congress 2026, suggesting that Türkiye, Russia, and China can establish a viable Eurasian axis to construct a stable multilateral order. The term "axis" is used here in its twenty-first-century context, implying neither a closed camp nor a hierarchy dominated by a single power. Instead, it signifies strategic coordination among nation-states that preserve their sovereignty while enhancing shared capabilities in energy, transportation, industry, finance, technology, and diplomacy.

The material foundation for such coordination is already in place. Russia possesses energy depth, defense capabilities, strategic raw materials, and a vast Eurasian reach. China offers manufacturing power, financial resources, advanced technologies, and infrastructure-building capacity. Situated at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, Türkiye possesses maritime access, industrial expertise, transport networks, and a deep-rooted state tradition, making it uniquely capable of conducting diplomacy across volatile regions. Their cooperation has the potential to interlink the Belt and Road Initiative, the Middle Corridor, the Black Sea, the Caspian Basin, and West Asian corridors. Consequently, it can foster more resilient supply chains, mitigate vulnerability to unilateral financial pressure, and reinforce sovereign solutions in West Asia, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea region. The article argues that multipolarity must transcend a mere balance of competing poles and be elevated to a multilateral order, with Türkiye-Russia-China cooperation serving as a primary driver of this transition.

Keywords: Türkiye, Russia, China, Eurasia, multilateralism; multipolarity; Belt and Road Initiative; Middle Corridor; financial diversification; West Asia; strategic autonomy; sovereign development.

For citation: Akfırat A. (2026). A Eurasian Axis for a Multilateral Order: Türkiye-Russia-China Cooperation and the Construction of Global Stability. *Noonomy and Noosociety. Almanac of Scientific Works of the S. Y. Witte INID*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 75–85. DOI: 10.37930/2782-6465-2026-5-2-75-85

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多极世界秩序的欧亚轴心——土耳其-俄罗斯-中国合作与全球稳定

摘要:新的国际秩序正在形成。问题已不再是单极时代是否即将终结。核心问题在于,新的力量格局将通过军事集团和经济胁迫来构建,还是通过主权国家之间的多边合作来构建。本文进一步阐述了在2026年圣彼得堡经济大会上提出的建议:土耳其、俄罗斯和中国可以建立一个切实可行的欧亚轴心,以构建可持续的多边秩序。此处“轴心”一词采用21世纪的含义。它并不意味着封闭的阵营,也不意味着由单一大国主导的等级制度。它指的是主权国家之间的战略协调,这些国家在保持主权的同时,共同增强在能源、交通、工业、金融、技术和外交领域的综合实力。

这种协调的物质基础已经存在。俄罗斯拥有深厚的能源储备、强大的国防潜力、战略性的原材料资源以及覆盖欧亚大陆的地理优势。中国拥有生产能力、金融实力、技术优势以及建设基础设施的能力。土耳其地处欧洲、亚洲和非洲的交汇处,拥有出海口、工业经验、交通网络和国家传统,有能力在冲突地区之间开展外交活动。两国的合作可将“一带一路”倡议、中线走廊、黑海、里海盆地及西亚走廊有机连接起来。这种合作能够构建更稳固的产业链,降低对单边金融压力的依赖,并支持西亚、高加索及黑海地区的主权决策。文章指出,多极化不应仅被简化为竞争性极点之间的简单平衡,而应提升至多边秩序的层面。土耳其、俄罗斯和中国的合作可能成为这一转型的主要途径之一。

关键词:土耳其、俄罗斯、中国、欧亚、多边主义、多极化、“一带一路”倡议、中线走廊、金融多元化、西亚、战略自主。

引用注释:阿德南·阿克菲拉特 (2026). “多极世界秩序的欧亚轴心——土耳其-俄罗斯-中国合作与全球稳定”//智慧经济与智慧社会. 维捷新兴工业发展研究所论文选, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 75–85. DOI: 10.37930/2782-6465-2026-5-2-75-85

Introduction

A new international order is being built before our eyes. This is not a prophecy; it is the plain fact of the present period. Economic weight has moved eastward and southward, strategic corridors have become decisive, energy security has returned to the center of politics, and financial mechanisms are used openly as instruments of pressure. The age of unipolar command has reached its historical limit. What comes after it will be decided less by declarations than by the states capable of creating new material and institutional forms of cooperation. It will be decided by states that can build roads, ports, pipelines, industrial chains, payment systems and diplomatic platforms.

The proposal advanced here is straightforward. Türkiye, Russia and China can form one of the most realistic axes for the construction of a multilateral order in Eurasia. In a more developed form, this cooperation can acquire the character of an alliance. That word should not remain imprisoned in the vocabulary of the twentieth century. Alliance need not mean a closed military camp, a rigid ideological bloc or the subordination of smaller actors to a patron. In the present century, national states are again the main actors of international politics. Their real need is to create forms of power sharing that protect sovereignty, enlarge economic capacity and reduce vulnerability to external pressure. The required form is clear: growing together through sharing, without surrendering sovereignty.

The material ground is strong. Russia is a decisive power in energy, defense, strategic raw materials and Eurasian depth. China is the locomotive of production, finance, technology and infrastructure construction. Türkiye is the key link at the intersection of Europe, Asia and Africa. Its position gives it access to the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Caucasus, West Asia and the Turkic world. Its industry, ports, railways, logistics networks and diplomatic memory make it more than a transit country. Türkiye can become a production and distribution center for a wider Eurasian economy.

This article develops the core thesis of the St. Petersburg Economic Congress presentation: Türkiye, Russia and China can act as a stabilizing Eurasian pillar in the making of a new multilateral order. The presentation underlined that world politics is moving from concentration to distribution, from hyper-globalization to resilience, and from centralization to diversification. It also pointed to the strategic importance of the Belt and Road, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Middle Corridor as parts of a possible Eurasian architecture of coordination. The task now is to turn that political proposal into a coherent academic argument without weakening its strategic force. The article addresses a gap in the current debate on multipolarity: the material and institutional conditions under which multipolarity can become multilateral order. Existing discussions often describe the decline of unipolarity or the rise of new centers; less attention is given to the concrete Eurasian mechanisms that can prevent the new balance from turning into bloc confrontation.

The main question is therefore clear: how can multipolarity be organized so that it does not turn into a struggle among rival poles? Multipolarity is a fact of power distribution. Multilateralism is a method of order. The first describes the existence of several centers; the second defines how those centers deal with one another. A world of several powers may produce balance, or it may produce a wider war of sanctions, corridors and military fronts. The difference depends on institutions, habits of consultation, economic interdependence and respect for sovereignty. Türkiye-Russia-China cooperation is important because it can help turn Eurasia into one of the main zones where multipolarity gains a multilateral form.

From Multipolarity to Multilateral Construction

Multipolarity should not be treated as a danger in itself. It is the historical result of the rise of Asia, the growth of new industrial centers, the recovery of national sovereignty and the weakening of a model based on unilateral command. The problem begins when new poles are pushed into confrontation rather than coordination. Institutions shaped under the old balance increasingly fail to represent the new distribution of production, trade, population and strategic initiative; the new order has not yet acquired sufficient institutions. This gap creates the danger of corridor wars, financial blockades and regional conflicts.

Multilateralism is the answer to that danger. It is rooted in the sovereign equality of states, one of the central principles of the United Nations Charter.¹ Yet the principle cannot survive as a ceremonial phrase. It must be translated into institutions, trade routes, investment mechanisms, energy projects and diplomatic commitments. A multilateral order requires material foundations. Without railways, pipelines, ports, payment systems, development banks and secure industrial chains, diplomacy remains weak and unstable.

¹ United Nations. Charter of the United Nations. San Francisco, 1945. URL: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>.

The world economy already points in this direction. UN Trade and Development reported that global trade reached a record 33 trillion dollars in 2024, while developing economies and South-South exchange played an important role in that expansion.¹ This is not a temporary movement in trade figures. It reflects a deeper historical shift: production, demand, infrastructure and population are no longer concentrated in the Atlantic center. The political form of the world must adjust to that movement.

The Belt and Road Initiative should be read as a field of diplomatic maneuver as well as infrastructure. Türkiye's active participation in the BRI expands its capacity to connect regional projects with global diplomacy and to avoid being locked into a single strategic direction [Gökçay, 2019/2020, pp. 43-54]. Corridors are not neutral lines on a map. They create political room. They allow states to reduce dependence on one center and to connect national development with wider regional projects.

The same logic is visible in the rise of regional blocs and institutions. The present transformation is not limited to a change in the number of great powers; it also requires forms of cooperation that can manage common challenges beyond the old Western-led institutional hierarchy [Gao & Durdu, 2025, pp. 47-84]. For that reason, the Türkiye-Russia-China axis should be judged by its capacity to build institutions, habits of consultation and material links, not by the vocabulary of twentieth-century camp politics.

The Türkiye-Russia-China axis gains value because each country brings a different capacity to this task. Russia brings energy and strategic depth. China brings production, finance and technology. Türkiye brings geographical connectivity, industrial experience, regional access and diplomatic initiative. None of these capacities is sufficient alone. Together they can create a line of stability from East Asia to the Mediterranean.

The Material Basis of a Eurasian Axis

Every serious proposal in international politics must begin with material realities. The Türkiye-Russia-China axis is realistic because it rests on complementary capacities, not on wishes. Russia's weight comes from state resilience, energy, defense, raw materials and geography. It connects the Arctic, the Black Sea, the Caspian, Central Asia and East Asia. China's weight comes from manufacturing, infrastructure finance, technological capability and the scale of its domestic market. Türkiye's weight comes from its position between continents, its industrial base, its ports and transport routes, and its ability to speak to several political regions at once.

Türkiye's own economic structure makes the issue urgent. TÜİK's December 2024 foreign trade statistics show that China and the Russian Federation were Türkiye's two largest import sources in 2024, with China at 44.9 billion dollars and Russia at 44.0 billion dollars.² This is not an accidental dependency created by a single government choice. It reflects the structure of energy, intermediate goods, industrial inputs and Eurasian geography. Türkiye's banking and policy habits may still be shaped by Western models, but its energy security and industrial supply increasingly point toward Eurasia.

The policy result is clear. Türkiye needs Eurasian partners for energy security and industrial inputs, while its position between Asia, Europe and Africa gives China and Russia an important

¹ UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Global Trade Update: March 2025. Geneva, 2025. URL: <https://unctad.org/publication/global-trade-update-march-2025>.

² Turkish Statistical Institute (TÜİK). Foreign Trade Statistics, December 2024. News Release No. 53538, 31 January 2025. URL: <https://data.tuik.gov.tr/Bulten/Index?p=Foreign-Trade-Statistics-December-2024-53538>.

production and distribution opportunity. Türkiye should not remain a passive market for imported goods or a route used by others. It should become a center where Chinese technology, Russian inputs and Turkish production capacity meet.

The proposal also corresponds to China's own long-term orientation. The Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative all point to an attempt to build relations beyond the old hierarchy of the international system. Their common vocabulary is equality, mutual benefit and respect. Whether one agrees with every element of Chinese policy or not, the relevant point for this article is this: China is offering infrastructure, finance and development language at the very moment when many states seek alternatives to sanctions, lectures and dependency.

Russia's role is equally clear. Western sanctions have pushed Russia to deepen its Asian and Eurasian orientation. This is sometimes treated as a temporary reaction to the Ukraine war. That reading is narrow. Russia's geographical and economic depth has always been Eurasian. The current period accelerates a movement that had already begun: energy flows, transport corridors, payment systems and security arrangements are moving toward a more continental logic.

Türkiye stands at the key junction of this movement. Its membership in NATO does not erase its Eurasian realities. On the contrary, it makes Türkiye's strategic choice more visible. Türkiye can remain within the limits imposed by Atlantic discipline, or it can act as a sovereign center that opens channels between regions. The second option is more consistent with Türkiye's geography, economy and republican state tradition. A Türkiye that deepens cooperation with Russia and China does not lose its international value. It increases it.

Energy and Transport: The First Line of Construction

Energy and transport form the first line of the Türkiye-Russia-China axis. A new order cannot be built on speeches alone. It needs arteries. Russia's energy resources, China's capital and technology, and Türkiye's pipelines, ports, railways and industrial zones can create a Eurasian belt of production and welfare. This belt would connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean, the Caspian to the Middle Corridor, the Development Road to the Belt and Road, and West Asia to Europe.

The strategic meaning of this connection is obvious. Energy insecurity quickly spreads into inflation, industrial disruption, social pressure and foreign policy dependency. Transport insecurity delays production, increases costs and turns geography into a weapon. A country that depends on one sea route, one financial center or one alliance discipline cannot act freely. The answer is diversification. Diversification is not fragmentation. It is the condition of resilience.

China's clean energy capacity gives this cooperation a new dimension. The International Energy Agency reports that China's clean energy investment exceeded 625 billion dollars in 2024 and that China reached its 2030 wind and solar capacity target six years early.¹ This capacity should not be seen only as a Chinese national success. It is a possible resource for Eurasian development. Russia's hydrocarbon base, China's renewable and industrial capacity, and Türkiye's transit and manufacturing position can create a mixed energy architecture suitable for the transition period.

The Belt and Road, the Eurasian Economic Union and the Middle Corridor should be read together. These are no longer separate initiatives; they can become one Eurasian architecture of coordination. This requires institutional dialogue, customs facilitation, port investment, railway

¹ International Energy Agency. World Energy Investment 2025: China. Paris: IEA, 2025. URL: <https://www.iea.org/reports/world-energy-investment-2025/china>.

modernization, digital logistics and political commitment. It also requires avoiding false choices. Türkiye does not have to choose between the Middle Corridor and wider Eurasian integration. The Middle Corridor becomes more valuable when it is connected to the Belt and Road, the Caspian, the Black Sea, Russia's Eurasian networks and the Development Road.

The Organization of Turkic States adds another layer. Türkiye's leadership in Turkic integration reflects a search for strategic autonomy; its strongest instruments are multilateral cooperation, energy links and trade, while its main risk is being turned into a pawn in great-power competition [Du, 2024, pp. 410-428]. For this reason, the OTS should not be imagined as a tool against Russia, China or Iran. Its real value lies in connecting the Turkic world with the larger Eurasian architecture.

Central Asia and the Caucasus have gained new importance because energy resources, trade routes and security questions now meet there more visibly than before. The OTS has become one of the actors in this landscape, with the Middle Corridor and TANAP supporting trade and energy flow and with its relationship to the Belt and Road increasing its economic weight [Ünver, 2024, pp. 386-397]. For Türkiye, this means that Central Asia cannot be approached through romantic slogans or Atlantic calculations. It must be approached through production, transport, energy and equal cooperation with all neighboring powers.

Industry and Trade: Türkiye as a Production and Distribution Center

The second line is industry and trade. The current structure of globalization is being reorganized. Supply chains are no longer shaped only by cost calculations. Sanctions, technology bans, maritime risks, energy prices and geopolitical pressure have become part of production planning. In this period, Türkiye has a chance to move beyond the status of a transit country. It can become a production, processing, assembly and distribution center between Asia, Europe, Africa and West Asia.

China's production capacity is the strongest industrial fact of the age. Russia's strategic inputs remain indispensable in energy, metals, agriculture, defense and advanced sectors. Türkiye has manufacturing experience, customs links with Europe, free zones, ports, SMEs, construction capacity and access to nearby markets. When these three capacities are brought together, an alternative to Atlantic-centered supply chains begins to take shape. This alternative does not require autarky. It requires a planned division of labor based on mutual benefit.

Türkiye's trade imbalance with China should be treated seriously. The point is not to reduce the issue to complaint or protectionism. The imbalance must be answered through investment, technology transfer, joint production, export-oriented industrial zones and access to the Chinese market for selected Turkish sectors, including tourism. This is the only serious way to turn a trade deficit into an industrial opportunity.

Türkiye's position gains real weight only when transit is joined with production. A corridor that carries goods creates revenue; a corridor surrounded by industry creates strategic capacity. If Türkiye limits itself to customs disputes and short-term import controls, it loses the larger opportunity. If it links Chinese investment, Russian inputs and Turkish production, it changes its position in the Eurasian economy.

Technology cooperation must be placed inside this industrial program. For Türkiye, the conclusion is practical. Cooperation with China should be directed toward factories, equipment, logistics technologies, skilled labor and higher value-added production, not toward rhetorical admiration.

Strategic autonomy does not grow by closing the country to the world. It grows by choosing partnerships that increase national capacity. Joint R&D centers, industrial parks, standard-setting initiatives, logistics software, railway technologies, port modernization, energy equipment and defense-adjacent civilian technologies should be part of the Türkiye-Russia-China agenda. Cooperation should produce factories, laboratories and skilled labor; it should not remain at the level of declarations.

Finance: National Currencies and Resistance to Sanctions

The third line is finance. The dollar system has not disappeared, and it would be unserious to say so. Yet its political authority has been damaged by its own use as a weapon. Freezing reserves, excluding countries from payment systems, threatening secondary sanctions and using banking channels as instruments of discipline have created a clear result: many states now seek alternatives.

The same logic applies to national currencies. When the dollar becomes a stick in the hands of one state, it loses part of its claim to be a universal instrument of exchange. The more finance is weaponized, the more states look for national currency trade, swap lines, alternative payment systems, gold, digital currencies and regional financial institutions. Coercion accelerates the search for alternatives.

The financial program already has identifiable components: national currencies in bilateral and multilateral trade, new investment banks, national card and payment systems, and reserve instruments beyond the dollar and gold [Latifoğlu, 2023, pp. 66-85]. In the wider debate, de-dollarization is less an immediate replacement of the dollar than a process of asset diversification and institutional experimentation in a post-hegemonic context [Gürçan, 2023, pp. 40-59]. This distinction matters. The issue is not to announce the sudden end of the dollar; the issue is to build the means of acting when the dollar is used as political pressure.

IMF COFER data show the same tendency in cautious statistical form. The U.S. dollar still dominates global reserves, but its share stood at 56.77 percent in the fourth quarter of 2025, while the renminbi share remained small but rising.¹ These figures do not announce the immediate end of the dollar. They show a longer process: states are preparing for a world in which no single currency can monopolize international circulation without political cost.

Türkiye, Russia and China can take concrete steps. They can expand national currency trade in energy, food, machinery and intermediate goods. They can build payment interoperability among banks and platforms. They can strengthen swap arrangements. They can create investment guarantees for strategic projects. They can support development finance for railways, ports, energy infrastructure and industrial zones. The aim is not financial isolation. The aim is to reduce exposure to unilateral pressure.

Financial sovereignty has direct political results. A state that fears sanctions at every step cannot act freely in diplomacy. A company that cannot receive payment cannot plan production. A corridor that cannot be insured or financed remains on paper. Finance therefore belongs to the hard core of the Eurasian axis. Without financial instruments, transport and energy projects remain vulnerable.

¹ International Monetary Fund. Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (COFER), 2025Q4 Data Brief. Washington, DC: IMF, 2026. URL: <https://data.imf.org/>.

Security and Diplomacy: From Coercion to Equilibrium

The fourth line is security and diplomacy. West Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea show the same lesson: intervention does not create order. It creates broken states, armed groups, refugee waves, energy shocks and permanent distrust. The region has paid enough for regime-change politics, separatism, terrorism and external manipulation. A new order in Eurasia must begin from sovereignty.

The Iranian question reveals the issue sharply. Pressure on Iran never remains limited to Iran. It affects the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Syria, the Caucasus, Central Asia, global energy markets and Türkiye's own security. A policy that aims to isolate or overthrow Iran therefore risks destabilizing the whole regional system. Defending Iran's sovereignty does not require agreement with every Iranian policy. It requires rejection of regime-change politics as a method of international order.

The Palestinian question is the second test. No stable West Asian settlement can be built while Palestinian statehood is denied and military force is treated as a substitute for justice. Palestine is not a side issue. It is one of the main points where Western double standards are exposed and regional anger is renewed. A multilateral Eurasian approach must defend a just political settlement, reconstruction and the right of the Palestinian people to statehood.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization provides a useful institutional reference because it treats security as more than military balance. Economic cooperation, cultural links, energy routes and the protection of strategic trade lines are part of the same security field; terrorism, separatism and extremism appear as threats to the routes of development, not merely as police matters [Şahin, 2020, pp. 24-35]. This approach is valuable for Eurasia. A railway, a port, a pipeline and an industrial zone all require security. Security, in this sense, is the protection of development routes.

Türkiye, Russia and China have different instruments for such a policy. Türkiye has direct borders, military capacity, diplomatic channels and historical ties across West Asia and the Caucasus. Russia has security weight, energy influence and crisis diplomacy experience. China has economic scale, infrastructure capacity and growing diplomatic activity in the region. Their coordination would not solve every conflict. It would strengthen the forces of equilibrium against the forces of coercion.

The Black Sea and the Caucasus demand the same method. NATO expansion, the Ukraine war, sanctions, energy disputes and unresolved regional tensions have made both regions highly sensitive. Permanent militarization is not a solution. The solution is a balance that keeps communication open, protects the sovereignty of regional states and prevents outside actors from turning local disputes into wider confrontations. Türkiye has a special responsibility here. It can be a corridor of escalation or a center of balance.

Civilizational Plurality and the New International Legitimacy

The new order also requires a new understanding of legitimacy. Modernization cannot be reduced to copying one political model. Türkiye, Russia and China have different political systems, historical memories and civilizational backgrounds. Their cooperation gains importance precisely because it brings together different experiences without demanding sameness.

Every nation has the right to choose its political system according to its historical background and social structure. Outside powers have no right to impose regimes under the language of democracy. The record of recent decades is clear enough. Regime-change campaigns have brought blood, collapse and dependency, not democracy.

The rise of the Global East gives this point a wider frame. East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, Central Asia, West Asia and North Asia increasingly form a complex field of security, politics, economics and civilization; in this transition from U.S. hegemony to multipolarity, historical self-definition, strategic autonomy and neighborhood diplomacy have become stronger [Degang & Yingqi, 2024, pp. 366-385]. This is more than diplomacy. It is a civilizational awakening. States that were once treated as objects of Western policy now define their own place in history.

The Türkiye-Russia-China axis should therefore be seen as part of a wider pluralization of world politics. It does not erase differences among civilizations. It gives them a framework for co-operation. It does not demand ideological uniformity. It demands respect for sovereignty, equality and development. This is the political meaning of plural legitimacy.

The same point applies to Europe, Africa and Latin America. A stronger Eurasian axis does not close the world; it opens room for others. Europe gains options when it is not tied to Atlantic confrontation. Africa and Latin America gain bargaining power when infrastructure finance, technology, energy and trade routes are not monopolized by one center. A fairer order begins when states have alternatives.

At this point the discussion touches the problem that Sergey Bodrunov formulates under noonomy and noosociety. Bodrunov argues that modern technological and socio-economic development reveals deep economic, social, environmental and moral contradictions, while also creating the objective possibility of overcoming them through a transition from economic rationality to a rationality based on knowledge and culture [Bodrunov, 2022, pp. 16-29]. A Türkiye-Russia-China axis would not itself constitute noonomy. Its relevance is more limited and more concrete: it can help create the external conditions for such a higher stage of development by strengthening energy security, industrial cooperation, technological exchange, financial autonomy and sovereign planning. Without those conditions, talk of a new quality of social life remains exposed to sanctions, war pressure and dependence on old centers of command.

A Program for the Coming Period

The Türkiye-Russia-China axis should be built through concrete steps. First, the three countries should establish a permanent consultation mechanism on Eurasian corridors. The Belt and Road, the Middle Corridor, the Development Road, the Black Sea, the Caspian and the Eurasian Economic Union should be discussed as connected layers of one continental architecture. Technical committees should work on customs, railway standards, port capacity, insurance, logistics data and industrial zones.

Second, energy cooperation should be deepened beyond short-term trade. Russia's resources, China's renewable and grid technologies, and Türkiye's transit and manufacturing capacity can support pipelines, storage, nuclear cooperation, electricity networks, solar and wind equipment, and critical mineral processing. Energy cooperation should be tied to industrial policy.

Third, Türkiye should be placed at the center of joint production. Chinese capital and technology, Russian strategic inputs and Turkish industry can create export-oriented manufacturing zones. These zones should target West Asia, Africa, Europe and the Turkic world. The objective must be clear: Türkiye should become a production and distribution base, not merely a market or corridor.

Fourth, financial cooperation should be institutionalized. National currency trade, swap lines, alternative payment systems, project finance and investment guarantees should become normal

tools. A Eurasian project cannot depend on financial channels that can be closed by political order from outside.

Fifth, security consultation should focus on sovereignty and anti-interventionism. West Asia, the Caucasus and the Black Sea require mechanisms that prevent terrorism, separatism and outside manipulation. The Palestinian question, the security of Iran, the reconstruction of Syria and Iraq, and the stability of the South Caucasus should be discussed through the same principle: regional problems must be solved by respecting states and peoples, not by imposing regimes.

These steps require political will. They also require intellectual clarity. Türkiye should no longer approach Eurasian cooperation as a tactical instrument in its relations with the West, but as a strategic orientation grounded in its own development and security needs. Russia and China must see Türkiye as a strategic partner with its own interests, not merely as a corridor. The relationship must be built on equality. Without equality, there is no lasting axis. Without planning, there is no construction.

Conclusion

The new order will be built by those who act. Multipolarity already exists. The question is whether it will remain a scattered balance of rival centers or become a multilateral order based on sovereignty, equality and common development. Türkiye, Russia and China have the capacities to make the second road possible.

The realistic solution is clear. Energy and transport must be connected. Industry and trade must be planned. Finance must be diversified. Security must be based on sovereignty. Diplomacy must replace coercion. Civilizational plurality must be accepted as a foundation of legitimacy.

Türkiye stands before a strategic choice. It can remain within the limits drawn for it by Atlantic discipline, or it can become one of the builders of the Eurasian century. Russia and China also face a choice. They can keep cooperation at the level of reaction to Western pressure, or they can help build institutions equal to the scale of the new period.

The Türkiye-Russia-China axis is not a fantasy. Its material foundations are already visible in trade, energy, corridors, finance and diplomacy. The task is to give these foundations a conscious political form. If this is done, Eurasia will cease to be a field of pressure and become one of the main pillars of multilateral order. This is the strategic meaning of the coming period: not waiting for a new order, but building it.

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